

The Universality of Human Rights: A Canadian Perspective

Senator Donald H. Oliver, Q.C.

Merci beaucoup pour cette charmante introduction. C'est un grand honneur pour moi d'être ici avec vous cet après-midi.

Je regrette que mes parents ne soient pas présents, ici, aujourd'hui. Ma famille maternelle et paternelle a travaillé fort pendant plus de 100 ans pour l'égalité et pour la protection des droits de la personne.

C'est un privilège pour moi d'être ici, au Centre Atlantique des droits de la personne, comme conférencier invité dans le cadre des Conférences Dr. Abdul Lodhi, pour l'année 1998.

Le Dr. Lodhi a été un pionnier dans le domaine des droits de la personne et de la justice sociale. Il a consacré sa vie à la recherche de la paix et de l'harmonie entre les peuples de la terre. Cette vision a été une inspiration pour moi.

Il y a deux semaines, j'étais en immersion française à St-Jean, au Québec et je sais que mes professeurs seraient très désolés si je ne disais pas quelques mots en français.

I come to you tonight trained as a lawyer - an education which some have suggested "sharpens the mind by narrowing its focus." One suspects that there is some truth to this, so I will try not to be too myopic and begin by saying that human rights are far too important to be left to the musings of the legal profession.

Human rights are of fundamental importance to all segments of our society and any discussion concerning them should be as broad as possible. But citizens will only take such discourse seriously if they believe that our political institutions, both national and international, can be effective instruments in the promotion and realization of these rights.

As a politician, I am well aware that there is a current disdain for politics among much of the public and, even, amongst some of the practitioners of the art. But I feel the art of politics is one whose transformative dimension we spurn at our peril. If we are left to conclude that today's politics consists of little more than cynical acts of self-interest justified by sophistry, we will never be able to tap those resources of public virtue that can aid us in reclaiming the public forum for genuine political discourse.

As a member of the Senate of Canada, I have been privileged to have had the opportunity to travel to such eastern countries as The Philippines, Japan, Hong Kong,

Thailand, Korea and Taiwan, and I have had an opportunity, particularly in the case of Japan, to learn something of the people, their culture, their traditions and politics.

I have been a member of the Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum and I have attended every one of its meetings since its inception in Japan in 1993. When papers were presented on child abuse, child labour, land mines, sexual mutilation of women, economic exploitation of the poor, I wondered whether there was a moral-ethical standard that existed that we could invoke that would have universal application. Or, if I were to condemn the Chinese for overt and fundamental abuse of human rights, could it be argued that I was applying a Canadian standard only and that I did not understand the people and culture of China!

With your indulgence, I wish to canvas with you what we know intuitively: that is that moral choices are above all about what is good in itself, objectively, and for all people. And our duties as parliamentarians are to translate that truth into binding and enforceable laws for the protection of all peoples of the world.

I will begin by looking at what are Human Rights; then review what we have today in Canada as Human Rights and finally look at whether these principles can be universally applied, and if not, where the legislators have fallen down.

As Canadians we can truly be proud of our record in the domain of human rights. This is not to suggest that it has been an unblemished one. More should have been done to provide equitable treatment for our native peoples and to prevent discriminatory practices against racial minorities. Today, it is important that we ensure appropriate mechanisms for the harmonious integration, into the mainstream of Canadian life, of new Canadians - the majority of whom are visible minorities. This fact was very much brought home to us by the recently released report of Statistics Canada which clearly illustrated the increasingly multi-cultural nature of Canadian society and the need to have a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of these groups.

It is important to note that Canada now has a Charter of Rights and Freedoms whose express purpose it is to protect Canadians against human rights abuses and to protect our fundamental liberties from government encroachment. The Charter has brought all Canadians under its protective wing. The constitution now speaks to a variety of groups that might earlier have considered themselves disenfranchised.

As you know, Section 27 specifies that the Charter be interpreted "...in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians." This section speaks to those who are neither aboriginal Canadians nor descendants of the French and English. Section 25 addresses Aboriginal peoples, and section 28 women. Section 23 addresses official language minorities and, finally,

section 15 singles out various characteristics, such as ethnicity, religion, age, sex, etc. that should not be used to deprive an individual of his or her rights.

Canadians are now linked to their constitution in a way never before possible; today, the Constitution is as much concerned with the rights of citizens as with the powers of government. Indeed, it might not be too bold to suggest that the constitutional bed-rock of "parliamentary supremacy" has been replaced by the "supremacy of the citizen".

In addition, we also have the Canadian Human Rights Act which, unlike other Canadian rights legislation, refers specifically to human rights. The Act enumerates a class of rights deriving from the principle "...that every individual should have an opportunity with other individuals to make for himself or herself the life that he or she is able and wishes to have." The list of discriminatory practices in the Act contains an enumeration of areas of human endeavour deemed to be of sufficiently central importance to individuals that discrimination within them constitutes a violation of human rights.

While we have made great strides on the domestic front, Canadians have also been central in the development and promotion of human rights regimes at the international level. Indeed, we have not only helped promote them, but, have ourselves welcomed their jurisdiction. International standards were used to strike down ethnic and racial restrictions in Canadian franchise laws against Chinese, Japanese, East Indians and Doukhobors. In the 1960's, as a response to the changing international environment, Canadian immigration policy moved decisively from racially discriminating (such as the Chinese head tax and racial quotas) toward universalistic criteria.

Canadian sentiment with respect to foreign policy has always been more internationalist than self-interested. As recently noted by former Prime Minister Joe Clark, "most of Canada's major international decisions were not driven by economic or commercial considerations." Obvious examples include our leading role in establishing the United Nations and in drafting the international declaration of human rights; our opposition to Suez interventionism and the virtual invention of peacekeeping; the renewal of the Commonwealth in the fight against apartheid and the commitment of successive governments to multilateral agencies and international agreements. Such activities went a long way in defining Canada as a distinct community.¹

I was very pleased, recently, to see our Minister of Foreign Affairs, Loyd Axworthy, again pressing the international human rights agenda. In his address to the Canada Club in London England, Mr. Axworthy stressed the need for a renewed commitment to existing institutions as well as the need to develop effective new institutions.

¹ Joe Clark, "The First International Country", International Journal, Autumn, 1997, pp. 539-545.

Canada is again playing a leading role, in this regard, as a member of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG). Since its establishment in 1995, the Action Group has acted as the crucible for Commonwealth responses to human rights violations in certain member states. The CMAG has provided a venue to assess Nigeria's progress toward the restoration of democracy and civilian government. Mr. Axworthy urged Commonwealth NGOs to bring their skills and particular qualities to bear in addressing the situation in Nigeria.

Canada is also supportive of the desire to establish an International Criminal Court. According to the Minister, such a body would give the international community a means to address the problem of impunity for human rights abusers, including war criminals. Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, have once again brought home the realization that prospects for peace and reconciliation are severely undermined when war criminals go unpunished.

At the same time we need to develop flexible and effective human rights tools suited to specific countries or issues. One such example is the recent symposium on human rights co-hosted by Canada and China. This was the first time that China had agreed to co-host a human rights event with a western country.

We Canadians have a commitment to reconciliation and peace. We govern ourselves on the premise that all cultures and ethnic minorities deserve respect. We are ever conscious about maintaining an equitable legal system and believe that government should be responsive to the needs of the people generally. By bringing Canadian views and expressions to the forefront of the campaign for an effective international human rights regime, we can make a difference.

However, despite much effort by Canada and others, there remains the real question of whether or not we will, in fact, ever achieve an effective international human rights regime that can bring under its wing all countries and their differing cultures. Today we are confronted with an irony: the Cold War is over, yet the world seems a far more complicated and unstable place - for many, it has become much more unpleasant. Those trying to come to terms with matters often behave as though possessed of the heads of Janus - one looking back longingly to a world of relative stability, the other, forward to an unpredictable future but one it knows must prove better.

If nothing else, the end of the Cold War has made possible a degree of optimism about the future of inter-state relations and our respective publics. And although the United Nations has not proven a panacea for mediating conflict, it has developed a wide ranging body of "understandings" to which we can turn for guidance and standards. Ideological super power rivalry no longer structures the world order and the pursuit of "rights" and "justice" need no longer be sacrificed on the alter of bloc interests.

In an increasingly interdependent world, nations will not be afforded the luxury of merely judging themselves. Their actions and progress in matters of human rights will be judged by the court of international public opinion, non-governmental organizations, and those standards which, through the United Nations, we have come to regard as representing the norms of civilized behaviour.

Cynics, of course, point to such agreements and argue that, although noble in intent, they are impossible to enforce. The criticism does not require debate, it is obvious. However, in granting the foregoing, it is important to note that these declarations and conventions have come to form an identifiable body of international standards on proper conduct for the relations between governments and citizens.

Are there universal principles? Are there universal values?

There are also those who will argue that the human rights principles set forth in UN documents and initiatives, represent "western" values and cannot readily be applied to non-western cultures. Some Asian commentators focus on the uniqueness of Asian values and emphasize the differences which, in their view, do not permit the application of moral standards which originated in the West, to their culture. Sometimes the argument is presented in terms of collective as opposed to individual rights; with the former assumed to be more characteristic of Asian cultures. However, the distinction is not new. Human rights discourse has long differentiated between two classes of rights: traditional civil and political rights; and economic and social rights.

The first emerged from the early struggles for individual freedom and democratic government. Rights here sought included, inter alia, the extension of the franchise, the rule of law, and the freedom of speech and assembly. The second (collective rights) arose from attempts by organized labour and citizen groups to ameliorate the excesses of laissez-faire capitalism. Concerns focused on improving the overall quality of life for all citizens. Rights pursued included the right of labour to freely organize and bargain, universal education, access to medical care and social programs, and the right to work.

While the two traditions can be distinguished, collective rights are in no sense meant to stand in opposition to, or supersede, individual rights; they are complementary. In fact, collective rights help to make the realization of individual rights more possible. Thus, a well-educated public will be more inclined to participate in, and recognize the value of, a democratic politics. Citizens with access to decent social services will be better able to cope with economic change and have a more positive view of their society and its institutions. An educated and "secure" public will be less inclined to tolerate injustices against others.

The western liberal-democratic tradition, upon which international human rights precept is largely based, is quite comfortable with the recognition of both classes of rights; sometimes referred to as negative and positive rights.

It is important to remember that human rights are not passive claims. They create a right to something - an entitlement which demands to be satisfied. Indeed, human rights claims are most essential and worthwhile precisely when rights are being denied or ignored, so that adequate recognition of them must be struggled for. Human rights demands are addressed to society at large and to its governing institutions. As Jack Donnelly has argued "human rights express not merely aspirations, suggestions, requests, or laudable ideas, but rights-based demands for social change. And these may be addressed even - in fact, especially - to one's own government."² This is as true of what are considered to be "negative" entitlements, which demand that government restrain its actions, as it is of the "positive" entitlements which call upon government to be more active.³

Moreover, it is a serious error to suppose, as have some critics of human rights, that negative and positive claims are mutually exclusive categories, with only the former being legitimately rights as held by individuals against the coercive power of the state. Most rights claims in fact have both a negative and positive aspect. Without a proper court system, provided for by the state, rights to personal privacy and property would not be safe. Or take the case of civil and political rights which may be denied to people who are poor, homeless, or on public assistance. Governments have a responsibility to work for conditions under which all human rights can be realized. Indeed, in societies where there are gross inequalities, greater equality may be necessary to achieve an overall net gain in liberty.⁴ As David Hume argued, "whenever we depart from equality we rob the poor of more satisfaction (and liberty) than we add to the rich."

The Bangkok Declaration of 1993, reaffirmed the "right to development" as a universal and inalienable right. In so doing, signatories recognized poverty as "...one of the major obstacles hindering the full enjoyment of human rights." Development is seen as a necessary precondition for the evolution and enhancement of individual rights and freedoms. Again, collective and individual rights are complementary; the latter can have little meaning for people living at a subsistence level. However, the collective "right to development" can never be used as an excuse for states to forestall the granting of individual political and civil rights. Individual rights will be better realized, and more enthusiastically pursued, by a public optimistic about its future; but they should never be

² Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 15.

³ Gerald Schmitz, *Human Rights and Economic Welfare: What is the Connection*, Parliamentary Research Branch, Library of Parliament, Ottawa, November 1990, p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

sacrificed on the pretext that one requires a certain level of economic development before rights can be granted.

If we can agree that the notion of collective rights should never be used as justification for the denial of individual rights, then similar claims might be made with regard to the notion of sovereignty. All too often, governments have claimed immunity from their abrogation of human rights by appealing to the international law principle which forbids intervention in the internal affairs of a recognized state. While not suggesting the abandonment of this principle, it is today possible to argue that international law protects the sovereign people, rather than the government which rules them.

For precedent we can look to the United Nations resolutions and sanctions against South Africa, which were based on the proposition that that country's legal system of race relations was a "threat to peace". As a consequence, UN action established the principle that domestic policy has implications for international security. Similarly, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) wrote human rights into an international agreement, guaranteeing them a place on the agenda of European regional security. Such understandings have implications both for those who would defend human rights, and for regimes that flout them.⁵ Security that sacrifices individual human rights is not real security. Long-term stability cannot be achieved by strategies that alienate and dehumanize segments of a nation's citizenry. Ultimately states are responsible for the dangers they pose to their own citizens.

To those who argue that the international human rights tradition is simply an attempt by the West to impose "its" hegemonic value system on others, one might simply note that:

- i. there is no such thing as the Western values which would neatly define human practice in countries from the Urals to the Rocky Mountains. The "West" too is not a monolithic entity but embraces a variety of value-laden cultures and traditions;
- ii. the values most often mentioned by Asian leaders such as "hard work, family, education, savings, and disciplined living" are certainly not alien in the Western tradition;
- iii. people continue to argue, to make judgements, take sides and criticize individuals and even whole traditions if they seem in conflict with their own value perception. By pointing out their views to the other party they implicitly presuppose and affirm a common ground for meaningful human interaction. At the practical level people do not seem inclined to abandon the idea of searching for standards of morality and rationality which obtain across cultures. In all their

⁵ Strategic Survey, 1993-1994, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994, p. 38.

differences cultures still share, and always will, the common denominator of being human.⁶

The central contribution of the word "human" to the concept of human rights was, in my opinion, usefully captured, in a paper prepared some years ago by the Parliamentary Research Branch in Ottawa. According to this paper; "The term human tells us, first, that such rights are universal: they apply to all human beings merely by virtue of their being human. It indicates, secondly, the ultimate value that is at the root of convictions about human rights. This value is 'human beingness' itself. It is because human life is seen as an ultimate value that requirements which must be met, if recognizably human life is to persist, acquire moral force (or become moral rights). Equally, failure to meet such requirements may be seen not merely to disadvantage those affected, but to dehumanize them; that is, it deprives their lives of characteristics which we associate with human life itself."⁷

The term "human" takes us beyond, or perhaps, "beneath" the variations of culture, country and history. While it does not deny the existence of these particularities, or negate their importance, it reminds us that, as human beings, we are also members of a universal community, and that the full scope of our moral obligations includes all people, everywhere.

The affirmation of universal values that is implied in the concept of "the human" may sometimes appear to involve an imposition of the values of one culture upon another, but it is more accurate to see it as recognition of the proper claim of the realm of values upon all individual cultures. Values are not values if they are merely reflections of cultures, although this does not mean that cultures do not, or should not, influence particular expressions of human values.

In a real sense, all values are culturally sensitive in that they are "contextually defined and dependent on an over-arching network of socio-cultural relationships which provides meaning and significance." But we also know, if only intuitively, that moral choices are, above all, "about what is good in itself, objectively, and for all people. There are moral rights and duties which obtain independently of race or culture, tradition or form of government." These rights and duties, in terms of practice and action, define human beings as human beings, not as citizens of this or that society.⁸

There will always be a tension between "universalist ethics" and local customs and beliefs. The tension is inevitable, and, in the long run, we will be better served if we view

⁶ Gerhold K. Becker, "Asian and Western Ethics: Some Remarks on a Productive Tension", *Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics*, No. 5, 1995, p. 33.

⁷ Jack Stilborn, "The Human Rights Mandate," Prepared for the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights, Research Branch, Library of Parliament, 1 December 1986, pp. 3-4.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

it as positive. Custom will always be subject to the critique of universalist ethics - in our context, the international human rights tradition. However, universal precept devoid of the appreciation of long held custom and its beliefs stands in danger of elevating itself to the level of idle, if not self-serving, abstraction.

To those who would turn to religious precept as a source of denial for human rights, one might simply note that it is important to remember that religious texts offer up two sets of laws - the one dealing with the relationship of the individual to God, the other dealing with the social relationships among individuals. Most would agree that, in contemporary society, the latter is open to secular intervention and rule. It is for this reason that we balance religious freedoms with equality rights.

States cannot ignore customary religious practices that infringe upon rights to which states are held accountable under their international legal obligations. No domain - not even religion - justifies practices that undermine human rights and no domain - not even religious institutions can be left unaccountable for their actions.

Such accountability does not require us to abandon traditional religion, it is merely to recognize that religious precept, like secular law, develops over time. It is subject to interpretation, and through that interpretation our understanding of its fundamental truths continues to develop. It is modified, as well, by our learning in other fields of human understanding. Only the literalist will pronounce ancient truths as never subject to "amendment".

Our human experience is an ever changing one, where concrete ethical norms emerge as the consequence of complicated and long term historical processes. The process is evolutionary. And, it is because of this understanding that today's Islamic scholars, believing in the Koran, can denounce the fundamentalist Taliban for their atrocious treatment of women and argue that such actions run counter to the teachings of the Koran. The Koran still remains the foundation for judgement.

Just as our understanding of history becomes more "full" and sophisticated with each successive generation, so too does our understanding of religious precept. Each generation needs to capture basic "truths" anew and come to understand them in light of their own realities.

All religious faiths can maintain their belief in an "ultimate foundation" - in that reality which lies beyond us - and, at the same time, recognize and promote the importance of human rights.

It is important to recognize, finally, that the issue of cultural imperialism is not merely an issue of the substantive meaning of human rights, and of whether this meaning differs from particular cultures or religious beliefs. It is also an issue of political process, or of

the way in which those who are committed to universal human rights go about the task of increasing their acceptance in all parts of the world. In fact, it may well be that concerns about cultural imperialism have more to do with the way in which human rights advocates have sometimes sought to influence the behaviour of others, than about the content of their beliefs.

We are all entitled to feel pride in Canada's contributions to the content of international human rights instruments, and its importance as an example of serious attempts at compliance. But we are justified in being at least as proud of the way in which Canada has sought to influence other countries and peoples towards the greater acceptance of human rights and values. Canada has not sought to impose these beliefs at gunpoint, or by other means of coercion (although, where necessary, we have participated in the use of force to prevent intolerable abuses).

In general, our dealings with other countries in international fora have reflected the recognition that debates about human rights require a degree of openness, and that all countries and peoples can learn from one another about the practical meaning of human values, and about critical priorities. Indeed, Canadians are sometimes criticized for being, if anything, too prone to self-criticism and that legendary Canadian deference. But, I think this spirit, when allied with a genuine commitment to human rights, is itself a real contribution to the progress of human rights in the world.

As the creation of international human rights institutions and processes itself recognizes, one of the most vitally important kinds of progress involves the participation of people, from around the world, in open debate, and in the serious exploration of the obligations which arise from a commitment to human values. This kind of dialogue inevitably takes on a life of its own, and has consequences for what governments do, and what citizens permit them to do. We can only expect others to embark upon this kind of discussion if we do it. And, if we remain demonstrably open to criticism and effective in improving our own human rights record, when open and public debate demonstrates that improvement is needed.

Human rights are on the international political agenda - and they are there to stay. Today, it is no longer possible to speak of world order without taking into account the protection of human rights and the remedy of human wrongs. But those who wish to do the right thing must remember that, for much of humanity, the available choices are not among competing goods, but, among differing degrees of misery. The irony being that even choices among the latter may have salutary effect.

The lesson is quickly brought home when trying to cope with the injustices of child labour. The harsh, and often inhuman, working conditions in which these children find themselves are well documented and need not be repeated here. The question for

policy makers is "what can realistically be done to put an end to child labour and exploitation?" Brief reflection suggests that the issue is complex and that it will take years, if not generations, before it is solved.

In essence, child labour is both a moral and structural problem. Moral in that the exploitation of the weak - especially if they are children - can never be justified. Structural in that the factors which impinge on child labour are multi-faceted and are not within the purview of any one single power - government or organization - to deal with. Children forced to work find themselves subject to pressure from a variety of sources:

- i. local poverty and custom;
- ii. exploitation by adults;
- iii. the interests of multi-national corporations looking to increase profit by relocating to areas of cheap labour; and
- iv. the globalization of international economic relations.

It comes as no revelation that patterns of child labour are principally determined by poverty. In some situations matters are further compounded by the belief, amongst many of the destitute and exploited, that bonded labour is a natural and inescapable part of reality; it has always been part of coping with the miseries of life on the margins and will continue to be so. If child labour is deemed to part of the "natural order" of things, then the determination to fight it will be difficult to come by. Such belief continues to foster resignation on the part of those who know no better, and cynical exploitation on the part of some of those who do.

For many children caught in the never ending cycle of poverty, the only available choice may be to accept the conditions of exploitive labour or to fall prey to prostitution. Again, real life choices are not always ones made among competing goods. If the options are to work for \$2 a day stitching soccer balls for a subcontractor to a multinational corporation, or being forced into prostitution, or starvation, then the first would likely prove preferable.

Some advances have been made in addressing this problem. But the overall record of International Human Rights protection is not an encouraging one. Recently, Mary Robinson, the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, and former President of Ireland, lamented the lack of progress being made in human rights protection. "The international system's achievements in implementing human rights standards," she argued, "cry out for fresh approaches....Count up the results of 50 years of human rights mechanisms, 30 years of multi-billion dollar development programmes and endless high level rhetoric, the global impact is quite underwhelming."⁹

⁹ Mary Robinson, "Shame Of Failure On Human Rights", The World Today, Feb. 1995, pp. 45-48.

We are then left with the question: "What is our responsibility in this regard?" I noted at the outset that there is a good deal of cynicism surrounding politics today. How can we get beyond this? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights "...tells people at the grassroots level that they have rights ...rights to security, dignity, economic rights and a better life for their children."¹⁰

The promise has not been kept. It is one that requires the efforts of all elements of our citizenry, and especially those of our politicians, academics and members of the NGO community. Are the answers obvious? Of course not!

We politicians need to do more to hold governments accountable for human rights abuses. Our political speech in these matters must be direct and honest - this is not the place for self-congratulatory soliloquies. Through our political institutions, whether on the House or Senate floor, or in our Committees, we need to educate ourselves and the public about these important matters. And, we need to follow up when studies are done and when our attention is drawn to particular cases of abuse. Together we can - we must - help those requiring solace turn their personal troubles into issues of public concern. This is no small challenge and, it is not one comprised of a series of well-intentioned acts from which one can move to other things. Our commitment in this regard needs to be continuous and we need to ensure that it is followed up by successive generations.

Our universities need to do more to bring human rights issues to the attention of the student body and NGOs have to be effectively connected to the political power brokers who would rather speak of the importance of potential markets than of the need to do the right thing. And we all must educate the wider public about the importance of international human rights and the sufferings that are still being faced by far too many peoples.

We can agree on the validity of universal principles from the perspective of different cultures. What we must not do is to refuse to judge. Relativism can all too easily provide refuge to the intellectually lazy and the morally corrupt.

We can make a difference. We owe this effort to those who remain, today, in desperate need of the fundamental protections and opportunities which can be provided by an effective human rights regime. We owe it, as well, to those, of all races and countries, who are already working together, sometimes at personal risk, to realize the vision of the fully human life which lies at the centre of the commitment to human rights.

As Keijiro Tanaka, the Japanese scholar and counsellor, at the Institute for International Policy Studies, reminds us, cultures are human creations in a state of continuous

¹⁰ Ibid.

evolution. The human rights tradition is no longer a specifically Western tradition (if, indeed, it ever was), and cries of cultural imperialism are increasingly transparent attempts to deny freedoms which are everywhere recognized as indispensable to acceptable conditions of life for individuals, and a tolerable future for mankind. In his words: "The greater the number of countries that respect fundamental human rights, that are governed by a democratic system based on the rule of law, the more peaceful and orderly the world...we should do all we can to foster the acceptance of universal rights and freedoms, and to improve the observance of human rights."¹¹

¹¹ Keijiro Tanaka, *In Pursuit of Universal Values*, Policy Paper 187E, Institute for International Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan, 1997, p. 17.